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BOOK REVIEW
The Dawn's Early Light:
The Contributions of John Hart Ely
to Constitutional Theoryt
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.
By John Hart Ely. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. Pp. ix,
261. $15.00.
STANLEY CONRAD FICKLE*
Professor John Hart Ely has been, in my judgment, the single most
creative scholar writing in the area of constitutional law during the last
decade. Consequently, when his first book hit the market,' I eagerly grab-
bed the first copy I could locate. It is fair although somewhat understated
to describe my reaction on reading Democracy and Distrust as one of pro-
gressive disappointment.
It's not that there is any question that the book is an event of major
significance in the development of American constitutional theory; no book
bringing together so much of Ely's thought could be anything less.
Moreover, Democracy and Distrust is short enough to be widely read, Ely's
engaging style ensures that few who pick it up will fail to read it through,
and his head-on confrontation with so many of the truly difficult issues
of constitutional theory will make ignoring it a pretty risky business for
anyone working in the area, bench and bar included. Even Ely's lengthy
textual footnotes retain their luster, although they are now buried in the
back of the book. It's just that an appetite whetted by ten years of Ely's
writing was not about to be satisfied by this shortened and somewhat
reorganized version of the material he had previously published.3 Most
T Cf. F. KEY, THE STAR-SPANGLED*BANNER (1814).
* B.A. 1962, Indiana University; J.D. 1974, Indiana University School of Law, Bloom-
ington. Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. My thanks
to Patrick Baude and Bryant Garth for several helpful comments on an earlier draft.
' That there would be a book was, to my knowledge, first publicly announced in Ely,
Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, n. T (1978).
2 J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
3Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205
(1970); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973);
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disappointing of all, Ely's treatment of the subject that had been publicly
reserved for the book 4 - a general theory explaining which governmental
actions ought to be subjected to strict scrutiny under the equal protec-
tion clause -seemed to be at best incomplete and, at worst, unconvincing.
I have sometimes wondered whether book reviews in the law journals
serve any useful purpose; rereading Democracy and Distrust for purposes
of this review has taught me that they may at least serve to educate the
reviewer. Although my overall assessment of the book did not change that
much, Ely's work is so full of subtle argument and nuance that I had not
nearly exhausted it the first time through. In addition, studying the book
reinforced my pre-existing view that Ely is moving constitutional theory
in just the right direction.
I
The ambitious task Ely sets for himself, as indicated in the book's sub-
title, is to construct "A Theory of Judicial Review." Such a theory must
be meaningful in terms of the specific values enumerated in the Constitu-
tion's text, consistent with the document's basic commitment to represen-
tative democracy, and justifiable in terms of a proper function for the
judiciary, that branch of government which is least accountable to the
political majority. Establishing those propositions is where the book
begins.
Chapter One, entitled "The Allure of Interpretivism," sets the stage
by discussing the central dispute in constitutional theory-whether
"judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enfor-
cing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the Constitution ... [or]
should go beyond that set of references and enforce norms that cannot
be discovered within the four corners of the document."5 Ely assigns the
rather ungainly label "interpretivism"' to the former view; the latter is
labeled "noninterpretivism." Interpretivism, limiting judicial invalidation
of the actions of the politically responsive branches of government to those
implicating values textually expressed or fairly inferable from the struc-
ture of the Constitution, is most notably identified in the judicial
Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHi. L. REV. 723 (1974);
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its A llure
and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978); Ely, Toward A Representation-Reinforcing Mode of
Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451 (1978); Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword:
On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978); Ely, The Centrality and Limits
of Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1155 (1978).
'Ely, Toward A Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451,
470 n.69 (1978).
J. ELY, supra note 2, at 1.
This terminology follows Professor Grey. See Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Con-
stitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
[Vol. 56:637
BOOK REVIEW
philosophy of Justice Hugo Black.' Noninterpretivism, which permits
judicial invalidation by reference to values not identified in the text, is
most commonly associated with the various forms of substantive due pro-
cess doctrine as recently exemplified by the Supreme Court's abortion8
and contraception9 decisions. The major attractions of the interpretivist
position- concededly always the dominant strain of constitutional law-
are twofold: "The first is that it better fits our usual conceptions of what
law is and the way it works";'" the second is that it is more responsive
to the central dilemma of any form of judicial review -reconciling judicial
veto of the actions of the elected representatives of the people with "the
underlying democratic theory of our government."" The allure of inter-
pretivism is that when confronted with the charge, "Where do judges get
off telling the political majority under a democratic government it can't
do what it wants?" the interpretivist can point to the text and reply, "See
there -the same Constitution that erects that largely democratic system
also specifies certain respects in which the majority may not have its way."
In Chapter Two entitled "The Impossibility of a Clause-Bound 2 Inter-
pretivism," Ely argues that the interpretivist's difficulty arises from the
Constitution's open-textured provisions "whose invitation to look beyond
their four corners -whose invitation, if you will, to become at least to that
extent a noninterpretivist- cannot be construed away."'3 Significantly, he
rejects the view that the traditional vehicle for injecting nontextual values
into constitutional law-the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment-was meant to have or should be treated as having substan-
tive content. For Ely, "the most important datum bearing on what was
intended is the constitutional language itself."4 On its face, the due pro-
cess clause seems clearly and directly to command that the government
employ fair procedures when going about the business of depriving a par-
ticular person of his or her life, liberty or property. The language does
not, on the other hand, appear to call for evaluation of the substantive
I With Justice Black's civil libertarianism as the main referent, Ely argues that there
is very little if any correlation between the "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism" camps
on the one hand and popular notions of judicial "activism" and "restraint" on the other.
J. ELY, supra note 2, at 1-2 & n.*.
a E.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9 E.g., Cary v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
J. ELY, supra note 2, at 3.
Id. at 4-5.
" The hedge is apparently inserted because Ely never ultimately decides whether his
theory of judicial review-centered upon the use of the Constitution's "open-ended" provi-
sions as well as others such as the first amendment to the end of maintaining the integrity
of the Constitution's system of representative democracy-is interpretivism or rather
something between interpretivism and noninterpretivism. As he indicates, nothing much
seems to turn on the characterization. See id. at 87-88 & n.*.
, Id. at 13.
Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted).
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policy the government is pursuing. The possibility does exist that, despite
the language employed, the framers in fact meant the due process clause
to have a more expansive and substantive application, but Ely finds little
support for that view in the history of the fourteenth amendment-
certainly nothing amounting to the very strong showing he would require
to override the clear import of the constitutional language."
5 This does not lead Ely to a constricted conception of judicial review in enforcing the
due process clause-as, for example, by limiting its application to judicial insistence on pro-
cedures provided by statute or those "settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in
the common and statue [sic] law of England ... which are shown not to have been unsuited
to [the] civil and political condition ... of this country." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856). Ely clearly contemplates an active
judicial role in assessing the fairness of the government's behavior when it is engaged in
activity that directly results in inflicting serious harm upon specific individuals; the point
is that the constitutional language directs judicial attention to issues concerning the pro-
cedures the government is using, not the permissibility of the substantive policy it is enforcing.
I do have difficulty with Ely's brief discussion of procedural due process doctrine as it
has evolved during the Burger Court years. He suggests that "[u]ntil recently, the general
outlines of the law of procedural due process were pretty clear and uncontroversial," that
the Burger Court has mangled the doctrine so badly that a conceptual "disaster" has en-
sued, and that part of the Court's difficulty may stem from its revival of substantive due
process. J. ELY, supra note 2, at 19-20. While one can agree that the Burger Court's evolution
of procedural due process doctrine - particularly its treatment of precedent and its analytical
tools for assessing the content of "life, liberty or property" as set out in Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), and evolved through
decisions such as Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), and Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb.
Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)-is a conceptual disaster, older cases such
as Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), and Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), refute the contention that
the prior law was "clear and uncontroversial." Furthermore, the Burger Court's rather in-
credible assertion that the content of "life, liberty or property" is more expansive for pur-
poses of substantive due process than for procedural due process, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 710 n.5, 713 (1976), seems to rebut any inference that the revival of substantive due
process is the root of the procedural due process malady.
In general, I think the Court's current difficulties are those that may be anticipated as
government and the society it governs evolve and constitutional values begin to be applied
to new sorts of governmental behavior-in the recent procedural due process cases, for
example, to governmental entitlement programs, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), public employment in cases not implicating
any other constitutional value such as the first amendment, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and governmental participation
in new types of private disputes, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971). Such circumstances present conceptual difficulties that neither the War-
ren Court nor any court before it ever really confronted. In addition, in the procedural due
process area in particular, the Court is struggling with considerations of federalism and
the legacy of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and related Warren Court decisions, which
construed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) to require neither exhaustion of state remedies nor state
authorization of the conduct complained of in order to state a cause of action. However sound
that conclusion might be on the facts of Monroe, quite different considerations may obtain
where the complaint is simply want of procedural due process unaccompanied by elements
of any other constitutional violation. Unfortunately, the Court has been unable to keep straight
any distinction between the constitutional issue per se and administering S 1983 as a statute.
See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 700 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Memphis
Light Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 28-30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the
[Vol. 56:637
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The privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment is,
however, quite a different matter. Noting the open-ended language, re-
jecting the received reading of the Slaughter-House Cases,16 which renders
the clause meaningless,17 and checking the facial import of the text against
legislative history illuminating the intent of the framers, Ely concludes
that "the most plausible interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is, as it must be, the one suggested by its language-that it was
a delegation to future constitutional decisionmakers to protect certain
rights that the document neither lists, at least not exhaustively, nor even
in any specific way gives directions for finding."18 In so concluding, he
disagrees with Justice Black's "incorporation" thesis that the privileges
or immunities clause, or the due process clause, or the fourteenth amend-
ment "as a whole" were specifically intended to apply the Bill of Rights
against the states. 9 On the other hand, Ely concludes, neither the language
of the clause nor historical evidence bearing on the intent of the framers
precludes later constitutional interpreters from arriving at that result.
Just as importantly, there is nothing in the language of the clause to sup-
port Justice Black's simultaneous contention that those privileges or im-
munities either are or should be limited to the guarantees enumerated
in the first eight amendments, and the historical evidence is to the con-
trary. In sum, Ely agrees with Bickel that "there was . . . 'an awareness
on the part of these framers that it was a constitution they were writing,
which led to a choice of language capable of growth.' "20 Employing the
related context of the equitable restraint doctrine, compare Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415
(1979), with id. at 435 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977),
with id. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), with id. at 339
(Stevens, J., concurring).
" 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
17 Ely presents a fascinating reinterpretation of that decision. J. ELY, supra note 2, at 196
n.59.
" Id. at 28.
," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,163 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
' J. ELY, supra note 2, at 30 (quoting Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segrega-
tion Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 63 (1955)). Ely, however, draws this conclusion regarding
the intentions of the framers of the fourteenth amendment over a far broader area than
Bickel, who was addressing the decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
A collateral but quite important contribution of the book is Ely's discussion of the history
of the fourteenth amendment (spread throughout Chapter Two of the book and several tex-
tual footnotes). Ely's work is a timely and effective rebuttal of the recently revived assault
on the Warren Court based largely on historical materials pertaining to the drafting and
modification of the fourteenth amendment. See R. BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
For an overall view of that part of the debate premised upon in-depth treatment of those
historical materials, see J. ELY, supra note 2, at ch. 2; BERGER, supra; Bickel, supra; Crosskey,
Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authori-
ty, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954); Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority:
A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 45 (1980); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949).
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same methodology-though relying even more heavily on the necessary
import of the constitutional language as compared to the use of historical
materials-Ely draws similar conclusions with respect to the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the ninth amendment."
Here then, concludes Ely, is the interpretivist's, at least the "clause-
bound" interpretivist's, difficulty. Such constitutional provisions command
injection of extratextual content and the interpretivist - the essential
premise of whose theory of constitutional adjudication demands
faithfulness to textual language- cannot, at least without further effort,
responsibly ignore the mandate.' That further effort, however, must result
in a mode of judicial review both principled in application and consistent
with the Constitution's central promise of democracy; failing that, perhaps
the courts should simply stay away from these open-ended provisions.'
Ely then turns, in Chapter Three entitled "Discovering Fundamental
Values," to consideration of various alternative theories of judicial review
collectively labeled interpretivism's "traditional competitor."24 While the
methodology varies, these theories have a common theme-that judges
should identify and protect particular substantive values that are somehow
determined to be truly important or "fundamental." Ely considers ap-
proaches urging appeal to the judge's own sense of basic values, employ-
ing principles derived from natural law or moral philosophy, and making
reference to "neutral principles," "tradition" and "consensus," and in what
is probably the single most persuasive part of the book, he devastates
them all.2" While the criticism varies, the most crucial point is that "fun-
damental value" theories lend themselves to elitist manipulation" and are
inherently inconsistent with the Constitution's most "fundamental
value" -democracy. Whatever the judiciary's proper role, Ely concludes,
" The fourteenth amendment confers federal rights as against state governments, whereas
the ninth applies against government at the federal level. Ely's subject is not federalism,
however, and he does not undertake to explore possible differences in application of his
approach to the Constitution's open-ended provisions in terms of the particular provision
invoked and the level of government to which it applies. See text accompanying notes 119-34
infra.
' J. ELY, supra note 2, at 38.
' Id. at 41.
24 Id. at 43.
25 Of course, in this field most of all, criticism is easier than formulation. Perhaps for
this reason, Ely's critique of the return to substantive due process methodology in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), contained in Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973), remains his single most powerful piece of writing.
ITihe list of values the Court and the commentators have tended to enshrine
as fundamental is a list with which readers of this book will have little trouble
identifying: expression, association, education, academic freedom, the privacy
of the home, personal autonomy, even the right not to be locked in a stereo-
typically female sex role and supported by one's husband. But watch most fun-
damental-rights theorists start edging toward the door when someone men-
tions, jobs, food, or housing: those are important, sure, but they aren't
fundamental.
J. ELY, supra note 2, at 59 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
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it is not the ascertainment and enforcement of nontextual substantive
values against the political branches.27
In Chapter Four, entitled "Policing the Process of Representation: The
Court as Referee," Ely lays the framework of his proposed theory of
judicial review. For its essentials, he points directly and perhaps surpris-
ingly to the work of the Warren Court. Notwithstanding that Court's
occasional lapses into the rhetoric of "fundamental values," Ely argues:
[T]he constitutional decisions of the Warren Court evidence a deep
structure significantly different from the value-oriented approach
favored by the academy.
Many of the Warren Court's most controversial decisions concern-
ed criminal procedure or other questions of what judicial or ad-
ministrative process is due before serious consequences may be visited
upon individuals-process-oriented decisions in the most basic sense.
But a concern with process in a broader sense-with the process by
which the laws that govern society are made-animated its other deci-
sions as well. Its unprecedented activism in the fields of political ex-
pression and association obviously fits this broader pattern.... That
Court was also the first to move into ... the voter qualification and
malapportionment areas. These were certainly interventionist deci-
sions, but the interventionism was fueled not by a desire on the part
of the Court to vindicate particular substantive values it had deter-
mined were important or fundamental, but rather by a desire to en-
sure that the political process-which is where such values are pro-
perly identified, weighed, and accommodated-was open to those of
all viewpoints on something approaching an equal basis.
Finally there were the important decisions insisting on equal treat-
ment for society's habitual unequals: notably racial minorities, but also
aliens, "illegitimates," and poor people. But rather than announcing
that good or value X was so important or fundamental it simply had
to be provided or protected, the Court's message here was that in-
sofar as political officials had chosen to provide or protect X for some
people (generally people like themselves), they had better make sure
that everyone was being similarly accommodated or be prepared to
explain pretty convincingly why not.... [Tihe pursuit of these "par-
ticipational" goals of broadened access to the processes and bounty
of representative government, as opposed to the more traditional and
academically popular insistence upon the provision of a series of par-
ticular substantive goods or values deemed fundamental, was what
marked the work of the Warren Court.'
Ely argues that the Warren Court's constitutional jurisprudence found
its origin in the famous Carolene Products footnote four.29 The core of
I Rejoinders to this aspect of Ely's work have appeared in the literature, but in my judg-
ment none lays a glove on him. See, e.g., Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980), and Lupu, Untangling theStrands oftheFour-
teenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1030-54 (1979). See also Cox, Book Review, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 700, 713-15 (1981).
J. ELY, supra note 2, at 73-75 (footnotes omitted).
"There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
1981]
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Chapter Four (which unfortunately does not hang together as an in-
tegrated whole), and indeed the remainder of the book (of which the same
is true), is summarized in Ely's characterization of that footnote:
The first paragraph is pure interpretivism: it says the Court should
enforce the "specific" provisions of the Constitution. We've seen,
though, that interpretivism is incomplete: there are provisions in the
Constitution that call for more. The second and third paragraphs give
us a version of what that more might be. Paragraph two suggests that
it is an appropriate function of the Court to keep the machinery of
democratic government running as it should, to make sure the chan-
nels of political participation and communication are kept open.
Paragraph three suggests that the Court should also concern itself
with what majorities do to minorities, particularly mentioning laws
"directed at" religious, national, and racial minorities and those infected
by prejudice against them."
For Ely, the most essential task is to reconcile the themes of the foot-
note's second and third paragraphs:
Popular control and egalitarianism are surely both ancient American
ideals; indeed, dictionary definitions of "democracy" tend to incorporate
both. Frequent conjunction is not the same thing as consistency,
however, and at least on the surface a principle of popular control sug-
gests an ability on the part of a majority simply to outvote a minori-
ty and thus deprive its members of goods they desire."
In order to reconcile these seemingly inconsistent themes, Ely returns
to and analyzes more elaborately the system of representative democracy
created by the Constitution. One critical aspect, of course, is the arrange-
ment for governmental accountability to the popular majority enforced
through the ballot box. Beginning with the original framers, however,
there was concern with the possibility of popularly supported, even
popularly demanded, governmental oppression of minorities. In part, that
concern was addressed by theory: "[R]epresentatives would govern in the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. ...
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
other types of legislation. ...
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review
of statutes directed at particular religious ... or national ... or racial minorities
... ; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political pro-
cesses ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."
J. ELY, supra note 2, at 75-76 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938).
30 J. ELY, supra note 2, at 76 (footnotes omitted).
", Id. at 76-77 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 56:637
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interest of the whole people .... [E]very citizen was said to be entitled
to equivalent respect, and equality was a frequently mentioned republican
concern."32 In addition, that concern was addressed in the constitutional
text by "listing" certain rights guaranteed to all, as those contained in
the Bill of Rights-which, Ely argues, are in turn mainly "procedural"-
and by dividing and allocating governmental power both vertically and
horizontally. As it happened, however, this was insufficient to guard
against majoritarian oppression, so:
[t]he existing theory of representation had to be extended so as to
ensure ... that the representative ... would not sever a majority
coalition's interests from those of various minorities. Naturally that
cannot mean that groups that constitute minorities of the population
can never be treated less favorably than the rest, but it does preclude
a refusal to represent them, the denial to minorities of what Professor
Dworkin has called "equal concern and respect in the design and ad-
ministration of the political institutions that govern them." The Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause is obviously our Con-
stitution's most dramatic embodiment of this ideal.3
Judicial review, Ely urges, should be about what the Constitution is
about, and
contrary to the standard characterization of the Constitution as "an
enduring but evolving statement of general values," . . . in fact the selec-
tion and accommodation of substantive values is left almost entirely
to the political process and instead the document is overwhelmingly
concerned, on the one hand, with procedural fairness in the resolu-
tion of disputes (process writ small), and on the other, with what might
capaciously be designated process writ large-with ensuring broad par-
ticipation in the processes and distributions of government.3 4
Particularly with respect to the Constitution's open-ended provisions,
judicial review should be "participation-oriented" and "representation-
reinforing"; an approach that, "unlike its rival value-protecting approach,
is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary (and quite by design) entire-
Id. at 79 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 82 (footnotes omitted). Ely further points out that the essentials of equal protec-
tion "process" theory-protecting minorities not by conferring constitutional entitlements
or guaranteeing substantive outcomes but by tying their fate to that of the political majority-
was well understood and in certain respects both textually expressed and judicially enforc-
ed long before adoption of the fourteenth amendment. J. ELY, supra note 2, at 83-85.
-1 J. ELY, supra note 2, at 87. To underscore this point, Ely undertakes a lengthy and
interesting-though ultimately collateral and distracting-survey of the Constitution, pay-
ing particular attention to those relatively few provisions that appear to address substan-
tive values and pointing out that several of these in fact serve, in whole or in part, pro-
cedural ends. Id. at 88-101. This survey appears to have led to the criticism that Ely's cen-
tral thesis, focused as it is upon judicial review maintaining and reinforcing representative
democracy ("process writ large"), would dilute judicial enforcements of the Constitution's
provisions guaranteeing fairness to the individual ("process writ small"). Tushnet, Darkness
on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE
L.J. 1037, 1046-47 (1980). Unless I misread Ely, the criticism is wholly off base.
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ly supportive of, the underlying premise of the American system of
representative democracy."35
Ely concludes the outline of his model by arguing that entrusting this
mode of review to the judiciary makes eminent functional sense:
Our government cannot fairly be said to be "malfunctioning" simply
because it sometimes generates outcomes with which we disagree,
however strongly (and claims that it is reaching results with which
"the people" really disagree - or would "if they understood" - are likely
to be little more than self-deluding projections). In a representative
democracy value determinations are to be made by our elected
representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we can vote them
out of office. Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of
trust, when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change
to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though
no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden
to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minori-
ty out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize com-
monalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the protec-
tion afforded other groups by a representative system.
Obviously our elected representatives are the last persons we should
trust with identification of either of these situations. Appointed judges,
however, are comparative outsiders in our governmental system, and
need worry about continuance in office only very obliquely.... [This]
put[s] them in a position objectively to assess claims-though no one
could suppose the evaluation won't be full of judgment calls-that
either by clogging the channels of change or by acting as accessories
to majority tyranny, our elected representatives in fact are not repre-
senting the interests of those whom the system presupposes they are.-
In the last two chapters of the book Ely further elaborates and discusses
particular applications of his model." Chapter Five, entitled "Clearing the
Channels of Political Change," pursues the theme announced in paragraph
two of the Carolene Products footnote -that of judicial review of legisla-
tion restricting access to or participation in the political process and the
"channels of political change." The main feature turns out to be the first
amendment, however, rather than those open-ended constitutional provi-
sions calling for outside reference (except, of course, insofar as first amend-
ment values are enforced against the States through the fourteenth). I
mean to imply no criticism by this; rights of speech, press, assembly, peti-
tion and political association are so central to the functioning of that
government created by the Constitution that if no first amendment had
J. ELY, supra note 2, at 88.
Id. at 103.
3, Both chapters appear to be exploratory and suggestive rather than exhaustive of the
possible applications of the mode of judicial review Ely advocates.
[Vol. 56:637
BOOK REVIEW
been textually adopted, the Court would have had to create one by struc-
tural implication. 8
Ely pursues his "participation-oriented" theme for judicial review in the
area of voting rights as well, including the malapportionment cases. He
also discusses but rejects on grounds of futility Professor Gunther's call
for meaningful equal protection scrutiny of all statutory classifications in
order to heighten public awareness of the reasons for legislative decisions,
thereby strengthening political accountability. 9 Ely concludes by sug-
gesting a substitute for Gunther's proposal-revival of the old nondelega-
tion doctrine. °
In Chapter Six, entitled "Facilitating the Representation of Minorities,"
Ely pursues the theme of the third paragraph of the Carolene Products
footnote-that of judicial review of legislation "directed at" particular
minorities, ones for whom majoritarian prejudice may curtail the protec-
tions against oppressive governmental action ordinarily afforded by a
pluralistic political system. The concern here is not with barriers to ac-
cess and participation by minorities in the political process. It is rather
with the failure or refusal of governmental officials to represent them -a
I To test the depth of any initial disagreement with this statement, reflect on a law pro-
mulgated by the "in" Democrats criminalizing membership in or association with the "out"
Republicans. Judicial implication of a first amendment might well have resulted in one
significantly different from and less expansive than our textual one; and it might have been
rationalized, at least at the federal level, in terms of "lack of governmental power" rather
than individual right. But so long as there is conceded to be judicial review at all, its exer-
cise in this area more than any other seems most essential "to prevent[ing] the defeat of
the venture at hand." L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14 (1958).
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Gunther's
proposal, calling for realistic judicial evaluation of statutory classifications in terms of ar-
ticulated governmental purposes, has never been generally applied by a majority of the Court.
A similar analysis has been used in particular areas of equal protection doctrine such as
gender discrimination, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648-53 (1975); Califano
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,212-17 (1977); but see Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Coun-
ty, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981), but the underlying constitutional policies seem quite different.
Gunther himself seems to have given up on the full-blown version of his proposal (judging
from comparison of the relevant portion of the ninth and tenth editions of G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW). The analysis continues to surface from time to time,
although only in dissenting opinions. E.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101
S. Ct. 453,464-69 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1087-89
(1981) (Powell, J., dissenting). For myself, I have never understood why, if truly convinced
that "Congress had no rational reason for [the classification and therefore that] the unex-
plained difference in treatment must have been a legislative oversight," id. at 1089, a judge
should not simply apply the statute to reach the result the legislature would have intended,
in light of the general statutory policy, had it thought about the matter, rather than engage
in presumptively disfavored constitutional adjudication.
'" See text accompanying notes 94-118 infra.
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failure or refusal that may in fact be directly responsive to the desires
of the political majority.
Ely begins by arguing that: "Benefits -goods, rights, exemptions, or
whatever-that are not essential to political participation or explicitly
guaranteed by the language of the Constitution [are] constitutionally
gratuitious - though obviously they may be terribly important-and
malfunctions in their distribution can intelligibly inhere only in the pro-
cess that effected it."4' At bottom, "malfunction" means governmental ac-
tion inflicting injury upon or withholding benefits from persons simply
for the sake of disadvantaging them rather than in pursuit of some other
governmental objective. This view takes Ely directly into the problem
of the motivation of governmental actors. He recognizes and discusses the
difficulties with judicial inquiry into legislative and administrative motiva-
tion but, he argues, however we ascertain it and whatever doctrinal label
we attach, governmental motivation is the relevant constitutional point-
most obviously under the equal protection clause but also frequently under
other constitutional provisions such as the first amendment. In a short
but very useful section of Chapter Six, Ely demonstrates that the "suspect
classification" branch of strict or "special" equal protection scrutiny is
simply a technique for flushing out unconstitutional motivation.
In the case of racial classifications disadvantaging blacks, of course, the
constitutional justification for proceeding from a basis of suspicion derives
from the central historical meaning of the fourteenth amendment. In his
most ambitious undertaking, Ely attempts to construct a generalized model
for identifying other situations where suspicion regarding governmental
motives and therefore a searching judicial inquiry is warranted." The issue
is what other classifying characteristics are "like race" in the relevant
constitutional sense, and Ely reviews and discusses the difficulties with
factors frequently mentioned: Immutable traits? That doesn't help aliens,
or illegitimates in many cases. And what about intelligence? Discrete and
insular political minorities? That description potentially fits every group
losing a political battle (as some group almost always will whenever a
political decision is made). Rather, the proper starting point is found in
the Carolene Products footnote, which refers to "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities," illustrated by references to religion, national origin
and race. 3 Accordingly:
" J. ELY, supra note 2, at 136.
4 This is, of course, a problem that has bedeviled the Supreme Court in recent years,
most obviously in the cases of laws classifying on the basis of gender, alienage and illegitimate
birth. See also Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S.Ct. 1074 (1981) (mental illness).
' In support of this point and his broader theory, Ely might usefully have drawn on Her-
nandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), where the Court equated governmental actions disad-
vantaging Mexican-Americans to those disadvantaging blacks:
Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined easily iden-
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If the doctrine of suspect classifications is a roundabout way of un-
covering official attempts to inflict inequality for its own sake-to treat
a group worse not in the service of some overriding social goal but
largely for the sake of simply disadvantaging its members-it would
seem to follow that one set of classifications we should treat as
suspicious are those that disadvantage groups we know to be the ob-
ject of widespread vilification, groups we know others (specifically
those who control the legislative process) might wish to injure. 4
Emphasizing the central point that it is failure to represent certain
citizens-to treat them as worthy of equal governmental concern and
weigh their interests in a relatively neutral manner -that is inconsistent
with the premises of the constitutional system of representative
democracy and violative of the equal protection clause, Ely argues fur-
ther that it is not only overt hostility towards and vilification of particular
minority groups ("'first-degree prejudice' ")5 that can cause malfunction
in the representation process. Rather, certain forms of stereotyping,
among which racial prejudice and its first cousins are only the most ob-
vious and virulent types, constitute a more generalized problem. Not all
stereotypes are impermissible, of course, since stereotypes are what the
legislative generalizations we call statutes are always premised on. Rather
it is certain "we-they" stereotypes that pose the danger of constitutional
malfunction in the process of representative government. "We" means the
majority of the political community and most governmental officials shar-
ing a trait in common; "they" means the minority of the community
possessing the countertrait. The constitutionally relevant myths,
stereotypes or generalizations are those reflecting favorably upon, and
showing attitudes of superiority about, persons possessing the majority
trait and reflecting negatively upon, and showing attitudes of inferiority
about, the group sharing the minority countertrait. As a matter of nor-
mal human behavior-and Ely supports his thesis by reference to social
science literature-such myths are readily accepted and acted upon by
governmental officials. When this happens, minority group members are
denied equal representation because governmental decisions adversely af-
tifiable groups which have at times required the aid of courts in securing equal
treatment under the laws. But community prejudices are not static, and from
time to time other differences from the community norm may define other groups
which need the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a community
is a question of fact. When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated,
and it is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that
class for different treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the
guarantees of the Constitution have been violated. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a "two-class theory"-
that is, based on the differences between "white" and Negro.
Id. at 478 (emphasis added). Maybe Ely shied away from Hernandez in light of the perverse
way in which the last sentence quoted was recently used. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1978).
" J. ELY, supra note 2, at 153.
's Id. at 162.
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fecting them are not the product of a process calculated to yield reasonably
accurate assessments of the social costs and benefits resulting from such
decisions."
Ely proceeds to combine this insight with other techniques of analysis
so as to identify the sorts of classifications that should warrant judicial
suspicion. However, the going gets rough, and Ely's analysis becomes more
suggestive than rigorous, ultimately coming across as incomplete and, in
some respects, unconvincing. The general approach is that courts should
"focus on whether something is blocking the opportunity to correct the
stereotype reflected in the legislation."47 At this point, Ely suggests, fac-
tors such as the immutability of the trait and the insularity of the minor-
ity group possessing the trait may play useful supporting roles in identi-
fying the most prevalent forms of favorable "us"/negative "them"
generalizations likely to lead to malfunction in the representative process.
If the trait is immutable, or nearly so, few if any of "us" have ever been
"them" and thus it is more likely that "our" generalizations about the dif-
ferences between "us" and "them" are both usually inaccurate and read-
ily, even habitually, accepted as a basis for decision. The same is true with
insularity, though Ely here means insularity from the mainstream com-
munity in the broad societal rather than merely political sense -the more
insular "they" are from "us," the less likely it is that many of "us" have
been in close contact with "them," which is also calculated to generate
and sustain the most widespread and least accurate stereotypes.
Employing this analysis, Ely discusses youth and old age classifications
(which he concludes are not suspicious), alienage classifications (which are),
and poverty classifications (which are, but this does not help the poor
much), and he argues that classifications disadvantaging homosexuals
should be strictly scrutinized although he concedes that laws criminaliz-
ing such conduct are constitutional. Ely closes this part of the chapter
with an interesting and provocative discussion of gender classifications
that is likely to displease the committed on both sides of the current
debate.48
The last portions of Chapter Six deal with issues that appear to have
in common only a want of someplace else to put them. They include a short
"aside" on affirmative action,49 a brief discussion of how Ely's approach
to judicial review can also inform interpretation of more "specific" con-
6 Most governmental decisions do not involve this danger for there is usually no strong
correlation between a majority of governmental officials and a majority of the political com-
munity in terms of possessing the relevant trait. Hence, for example, there is no reason for
special scrutiny of a legislative decision advantaging optometrists and disadvantaging opti-
cians. Id. at 155-56; see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
47 J. ELY, supra note 2, at 165.
46 See id. at 164-70.
" I suggest reading instead Ely, Reverse Racial Discrimination, supra note 3.
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stitutional provisions relating to fair procedure, using the fourth and
eighth amendments as illustrations, and a brief but provocative discus-
sion of the so-called "right to travel."
II
Ely's contention that judicial review should be about what the Constitu-
tion is about-that it should draw its sustenance from and serve to rein-
force and protect the central and interrelated structural components of
the Constitution-is obviously intuitively appealing. And unlike others,0
I find persuasive his insistence that those structural components reflect
primarily dynamic, process-oriented themes, and his conclusion that con-
tent for the Constitution's open-ended provisions should be derived from
the document's over-arching theme and purpose-the political system it
was drafted to create. In addition, his elaborations of the model, while
exploratory, are always intriguing and often quite persuasive.
On the other hand, given its centrality to his thesis, it is quite
troublesome that Ely presents, and erects the elaborate superstructure
of theory in Chapters Five and Six on the basis of, what is at best a brief
and fragmentary analysis of the constitutional system of representative
democracy. I also find it at least counter-intuitive that those last two
chapters of the book, elaborations of Carolene Products footnote
paragraphs two and three respectively, fly off in quite separate directions
with a notable lack of later effort systematically to connect them. Fur-
thermore, I firmly believe that by the end of his analysis of the problem
of judicial enforcement of governmental representation of unpopular
minorities, Ely has run quite badly off the track. In the following pages,
I discuss these difficulties in reverse order and widely varying degrees
of depth.
At least in the most virulent forms, governmental actions denying equal
protection originate in widespread majoritarian prejudice against and
hostility towards particular minority groups. But, Ely says, never mind
whether that hostility is "unjustified"; for a court to make that assess-
ment is impermissibly to intrude upon the decisionmaking processes
reserved to the political branches of government.5 1 The initial question
for the court is simply whether such hostility exists. If so, the court must
ascertain whether a law singling out such a group for disadvantageous
treatment realistically serves some substantial governmental purpose. And
even if it does, if that purpose would be better served by an alternative
classification, the court is justified in concluding that the real governmental
purpose (or at least one of the purposes) is to disadvantage the unpopular
50 E.g., Tribe, supra note 27; Tushnet, supra note 34.
1' J. ELY, supra note 2, at 153-54.
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group. In that event, the members of the group have been denied equal
protection of the laws since they are being harmed for the sake of that
harm rather than in pursuit of some other objective.
The case of laws disadvantaging burglars (surely an unpopular minori-
ty group), as by criminally sanctioning their conduct, is easily handled
within the model. The classification corresponds perfectly to the legitimate
governmental purpose of keeping such persons out of other people's
homes.2 When Ely gets to the case of homosexuals, concededly another
unpopular group, he finds that laws criminalizing that behavior are also
constitutionally permissible. The court may not second-guess the ma-
joritarian judgment that such conduct is immoral and undesirable -Ely,
of course, must concede this, given his rejection of judicial review premised
upon identifying nontextual "fundamental values" deserving special
judicial protection-and use of the criminal sanction fits well with the
governmental purpose of deterring it. He argues, nevertheless, that other
sorts of laws disadvantaging homosexuals- barring them from public
employment, for example-should rarely, if ever, survive equal protec-
tion analysis.53 Such rules, originating in widespread community hostili-
ty, continue the group's isolation and reinforce majoritarian prejudice by
blocking the avenues of contact and relationship formation that might lead
to attitudinal and eventually political change.
Ely's analysis of the homosexual case puts me in a quandary, however,
when applied to the burglars. What about laws that civilly disable burglars
as by barring them from employment? Ely himself concedes the validity
of such laws, 4 but if the same analysis obtains as in the case of the
homosexual (and I can identify no element of his model which justifies
a different conclusion), laws disadvantaging burglars by imposing civil
disabilities should be subject to the same strict scrutiny and likewise rare-
ly survive.5
Perhaps the difference is that civilly disabled burglars have been
criminally convicted of an offense whereas ordinarily the homosexual bar-
red from employment has not." In the alternative, maybe Ely has the
' Id. at 154.
"IL]aws denying homosexuals certain benefits, most likely occupational oppor-
tunities, must be defended in terms of a virtually perfect fit with a legitimate
and substantial goal. This will seldom, if ever, be possible." Id. at 255 n.92.
' Id. at 250 n.65. He notes that there would be an ex post facto problem, however, if such
disabling legislation were enacted and applied after the conviction.
' This is not to say that under such an approach a law discriminating against burglars
could never survive equal protection scrutiny. A rule barring persons with a burglary con-
viction from employment as a security guard would fit pretty well with an obvious and
legitimate governmental purpose. However, denying burglars a medical license, the case which
Ely discusses, id. at 250 n.65, seems a quite different matter.
I certainly would not like a distinction which forced the government to use the criminal
sanction rather than milder forms of penalties to punish and deter undesirable conduct, nor
do I see any constitutional justification for it. Furthermore, distinguishing between burglars
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burglar's case wrong, and his process reasoning should lead to the result
that civil disabilities afflicting ex-felons as a group are generally invalid.
Grossly inaccurate "we/they" stereotypes are probably even more
prevalent in the case of convicted felons than in the case of homosexuals.
These group generalizations prompt disadvantageous governmental rules
that in turn reinforce insularity and block the "we/they" contact that might
lead to greater understanding and attitudinal change.
I think, however, that it is rather the homosexual case that Ely has
gotten wrong. Something quite different is going on in the homosexual
and burglar case as compared to the classic "suspect classification" case
of race. Expressing popular moral opposition to the burglar's and homosex-
ual's conduct is conceded to be a legitimate object of governmental policy.
Therefore, quite apart from the fact that laws disadvantaging persons who
engage in that conduct will ordinarily fit well with the governmental in-
terest in deterrence, harming such persons who engage in that conduct
for the sake of that harm alone is legitimate so long as retribution is a
proper end of the law." Injuring blacks for the sake of injuring them, on
the other hand, clearly contravenes the central meaning of the fourteenth
amendment.
I think the constitutional distinction between the homosexual case and
traditional suspect classifications such as race lies in the following direc-
tion. To encourage people to join the majoritarian community, to share
its values and behave in popularly approved or accepted ways, is a
legitimate object of governmental policy except insofar as the Constitu-
tion expressly or by fair implication provides otherwise (most obviously,
in the areas of speech, religion and political association). What is
illegitimate-at odds with the system of representative democracy Ely
describes and constituting a denial of equal protection-is governmental
action calculated to maintain the separateness between unpopular and
prejudice-burdened groups and the majority community and keep the un-
popular "in their place" - governmental action for the purpose of preven-
ting or impeding the efforts of members of such groups to join the cultural,
economic and social mainstream and participate fully in the benefits and
responsibilities of civil society.
To construct a general theory explaining that equal protection command-
ed by the Constitution and identifying those instances in which the pro-
cesses of representative government have impermissibly malfunctioned,
and homosexuals on this ground is irrational in terms of the permissible governmental pur-
pose of deterring conduct that is otherwise reasonably likely to occur in the future.
Although far from persuasive in terms of Ely's theory, it might be argued that civil
disabilities affecting convicted felons should be treated as a special case by extension of the
reasoning in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
5, I see nothing in the Constitution to suggest that it is not. Ely does not discuss the point.
If ever the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment might speak to this
issue as reflective of societal consensus, today is not that day.
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we need to understand what other group traits are, as Ely says, "like race
in some relevant sense."" Focusing upon widespread majoritarian pre-
judice and hostility and detecting the infliction of harm for its own sake
rather than in pursuit of some other governmental objective are impor-
tant considerations.59 Contrary to Ely's contention, however, the Court
cannot avoid the question whether that majoritarian prejudice reflected
through governmental action is "unjustified" in some relevant sense,' and
the fourteenth amendment is reasonably suggestive as to which "justifica-
tions" are constitutionally out of bounds.
The most important sentence of the fourteenth amendment is the one
with which it begins:" "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside."6 Conferring the status of
citizenship was the single most important measure that could have been
taken by the framers of the fourteenth amendment to remedy the
historical problem most centrally involved-full emancipation for the
freedmen with the right to participate in and enjoy the benefits of civil
society. The subsequent clauses of section 1- privileges or immunities,
equal protection and due process-must be understood as supportive of
and as particular structural means to ensuring the goal of citizenship
status. The equal protection clause in particular is first and foremost, if
not exclusively, a command that governmental decisions proceed on the
basis of the fundamental proposition of full and equal citizenship.
As Justice Douglas frequently reminded us,' the antithesis of equal
citizenship is "caste," maintaining rigid group distinctions by assigning
status to individuals on the basis of ascriptive characteristics and deny-
ing them opportunities for social, political and economic mobility. A caste
system arises from group-based prejudice, fear and hostility, leading to
cultural mores mandating separateness and behavioral differences. Those
rules in turn reinforce group prejudice and hostility by perpetuating
stereotypic behavior and attitudes concerning group inferiority and
superiority, and by denying the opportunities for contact and the forma-
J. ELY, supra note 2, at 149.
' The inquiry must be sufficiently flexible to deal with variations at the state and local
levels. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
' See Baker, Neutrality, Process and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protec-
tion, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1029, 104649 (1980).
S See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 33-66 (1969); Karst,
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977). But see A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33-54 (1975).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
E.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 387 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 61-67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 181 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring). See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409,444-49 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,242-60 (1964) (Douglas,
J., concurring in part); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 185 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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tion of relationships that would undermine existing sentiment. The more
effective a caste system is, the more its effects will be intergenerational.
The fourteenth amendment renders impermissible governmental actions
undertaken for the purpose of perpetuating these self-reinforcing cultural
cycles.
Ely correctly focuses upon widespread dislike, hostility and prejudice
toward certain minority groups as indicia of the likelihood of illicit govern-
mental motivation, but the category of impermissible- constitutionally
illegitimate- governmental purposes that result from such popular sen-
timent is not limited to the infliction upon minorities of harm for its own
sake. Rather it also includes purposes to keep members of such groups
separate and apart from the majority, and in a status that is inferior as
defined by popular criteria." Although it may be ever so popular with
the majority, governmental action calculated to prevent persons from gain-
ing access to the mainstream community and participating in its respon-
sibilities and benefits is to treat such persons as if they were not citizens
of the civil society; it is governmental deprivation of the very status the
fourteenth amendment confers and guarantees.
Ely's insight that malfunction in the process of representative govern-
ment is not limited to expressions of "first-degree" prejudice -conscious
emotions and sentiments reflecting hostility and leading to affirmative in-
tention to harm-is quite crucial here. Subjective good faith on the part
of governmental decisionmakers notwithstanding, unreflective and reflex-
ive acceptance of pernicious "we/they" generalizations"5 will deny.members
of the minority group equal representation and hence equal protection.
But it is also crucial to recognize that such derogatory group
generalizations -which are no less common nor any less likely to be
governmentally acted upon then sentiments reflecting outright hostility
or overt prejudice -will often underlie facially neutral governmental rules
that disproportionately disadvantage such minorities just as they do rules
that classify on the basis of the minority trait.6
Admittedly, the two are often closely intertwined, but the second seems the more
prevalent if judged by the American experience.
" Again, "we/they" generalizations are those that relate to groups-majority and
minority-defined by a trait possessed in common by the political majority and a majority
of elected governmental officials and not possessed by the minority. The minority so defined
is, at least ordinarily, the object of dislike, prejudice and hostility by a large segment of the
community majority, whether or not such overt hostility or prejudice is consciously felt or
acted upon by governmental officials. The generalizations that are of concern are those reflec-
ting the superiority of "us" and the inferiority of "them."
, For a classic illustration, see Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979), which
involved the use of standardized intelligence tests for purposes of placing public school children
in special classes for the "educable mentally retarded." Use of the tests resulted in vastly
disproportionate numbers of black children being placed permanently in what were "conceived
of as 'dead-end classes.' " Id. at 941. Given numerous indications that the objectivity of the
tests was questionable, including evidence of cultural bias, id. at 956-60, the lack of any ef-
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This should mean that the subjective motivation analysis currently in
vogue in the disproportionate impact cases such as Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,6 where the fourteenth
amendment's proscription of invidious racially discriminatory purpose is
translated into a requirement that plaintiffs prove subjective bad faith
on the part of governmental actors, is in need of serious rethinking. Prob-
lems of proving subjective intent wholly aside, governmental action
motivated by overt hostility is not the only way-and these days is
perhaps not even the major way-in which racial minorities and others
constitutionally like them are injured by malfunctions in the representa-
tion process. Analytical techniques are needed to flush out and condemn
at least the more important instances of these other varieties of equal
protection denial as well. 8 Unfortunately, Ely does not pursue this line
of inquiry and appears to approve of the Court's reasoning in Arlington
Heights.9
The point is further illustrated by reference to Ely's relatively breezy
rejection of meaningful equal protection scrutiny in most instances of
governmental action disadvantaging the poor" and his failure to analyze
the "fundamental rights or interests" branch of equal protection doctrine.'
I believe the two are related.
Notwithstanding Supreme Court dicta to the contrary,"2 poverty "stan-
ding alone" is a suspect classification. Roughly since Edwards v.
California,73 statutes which facially classify on the basis of indigency and
which have the effect of disadvantaging the poor have been constitutional-
ly "suspect" and subject to the same strict scrutiny as attends racial
classifications having the effect of disadvantaging racial minorities. Cer-
tainly the ingredients justifying suspect classification treatment obtain-
not only "we/they" stereotyping originating in majoritarian prejudice and
fort to validate the test for black children, id. at 970-71, and substantial indication that test
performance was a less accurate predictor of academic performance in the case of black
children, id. at 972-73, the court concluded that continued use of the tests by school officials
was "consistent only with an... [unproven] assumption of a higher incidence of mental retar-
dation among blacks .... " id. at 933.
"7 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
66 It is this difficulty and line of inquiry that Justice Stevens appears to be pursuing with
his legislative "impartiality" notion and his insistence that disparate impact cases should be
decided on the basis of objective criteria rather than subjective motivation. E.g., City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 83-92 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 252-56 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See also New York City Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
69 J. ELY, supra note 2, at 137 & n.9.
'o J. ELY, supra note 2, at 148-49, 162.
"' See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
' Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980).
" 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 184-85 (Jackson, J., concurring).
See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-33 to -35 (1978).
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widespread social hostility and vilification but also popular desire on the
part of the majoritarian community to keep itself and its culture separate
and apart from the poor. The elements of a caste system are certainly
present; while poverty is obviously not an immutable trait like race in
each individual case, the strength of the intergenerational correlation can-
not be denied.
Ely does conclude that indigency classifications should be treated as
suspect but, he contends, "[a] theory of suspicious classification will...
be of only occasional assistance to the poor, since their problems are not
often problems of classification to begin with."'74 His point-and the only
intelligible meaning that can be given to those judicial dicta7 5-is that
statutes facially classifying on the basis of poverty are rare; ordinarily
legislation merely disproportionately disadvantages the poor, as by charg-
ing a standard fee for a governmentally provided service. In Ely's view,
apparently, facially neutral governmental rules having only a disparate
impact on the poor-that is, unaccompanied by proof of subjective motiva-
tion intentionally to disadvantage-easily survive equal protection scrutiny
since such rules need only bear the traditional rational relationship to some
legitimate governmental purpose.76
It is precisely in the area of governmental actions disproportionately
disadvantaging groups such as the poor, however, that the "fundamental
right or interest" branch of equal protection doctrine occasionally has been,
and more frequently should be, invoked. Surely some such explanation
must underlie the decision in Shapiro v. Thompson,77 invalidating a one
year state residency requirement to qualify for welfare payments. For-
mally, perhaps, the statutory rule was subjected to strict equal protec-
tion scrutiny and invalidated because it treated persons differently based
upon their exercise of the "right to travel" or migrate from state to state.
Yet that decision simply cannot be understood as involving only unequal
treatment based on the exercise of a fundamental right. Rather, it was
crucial to the decision that the law disproportionately disadvantaged in
the exercise of that right members of a group that would receive the pro-
tection of "suspect classification" strict scrutiny in cases of statutes facial-
ly singling it out.78 When later confronted with another statute classify-
ing on the basis of exercise of the same "fundamental right" but having
a far more neutral effect in terms of popular attitudes towards the group
7' J. ELY, supra note 2, at 162.
71 Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980).
"' In fact, Ely would dispense altogether with "rational basis" equal protection analysis,
J. ELY, supra note 2, at 251 n.69, a suggestion with which I wholly concur.
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
79 Indeed, the same impermissible purpose that justifies the use of "suspect classification"
treatment for this group-the intent to discourage the poor from migrating because they
are poor-was in fact argued by the state to be one of the purposes underlying the rule. Id.
at 627-31.
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disadvantaged - a one year residency requirement for a divorce-the
Court quite properly found the right not to have been impermissibly
infringed.79
"Fundamental right" or "interest" equal protection doctrine has serv-
ed and properly should serve a function quite similar to that of its cousin,
the "suspect classification". Ely convincingly demonstrates how the suspect
classification construct serves as a handmaiden to motivation analysis.
When a racial group, for example, is the object of widespread social hostili-
ty and prejudice, the Court is properly suspicious of statutes classifying
on the basis of that racial characteristic to the detriment of that group.
The suspect classification mode of analysis, insisting that such classifica-
tions be not merely rationally related to some conceivable governmental
purpose but rather demonstrated by the state to be necessary to the
achievement of a substantial and legitimate purpose identified by the state,
serves to flush out and condemn that illegitimate purpose we suspect is
involved-the disadvantaging of the group as a reflection of community
prejudice and hostility. In a similar fashion, strict scrutiny of rules un-
equally impeding the exercise of or denying access to "fundamental" rights
or interests can serve to flush out and condemn governmental decisions
tainted by unreflective acceptance of derogatory generalizations about
"them" -governmental rules that, while not facially employing a "suspect"
classification, do disproportionately disadvantage groups defined by
characteristics that would be treated as suspect if overtly used as the basis
for governmental action.0
The rub comes, of course, in identifying which rights or interests should
be treated as "fundamental" for purposes of strict equal protection
scrutiny. One possibility is to do what the Burger Court frequently says
it has done-limit "fundamental rights or interests" to those marked as
special by other provisions of the Constitution81 - but that gets the equal
protection point all wrong. A very different approach is justified here,
one I believe to be susceptible of principled application, responsive to the
" Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). Compare Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250 (1974) (invalidating residency requirement for indigent medical care), with Starns
v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (affirming decision upholding one year residency require-
ment for in-state university tuition).
' It is worth noting that the fourteenth amendment calls for "equal protection of the laws"
and does not refer to "classifications," statutory or otherwise. While "classification" on the
basis of race or other suspect criteria may often be the most direct means to the constitu-
tionally impermissible end, it is certainly not the only means. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (use of poll taxes and literacy tests for voting); Rothstein, The Politics
of Legal Reasoning: Conceptual Contests and Racial Segregation, 15 VAL. L. REV. 81, 97 n.52(1980).
8 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). But see id.
at 34 nn.73 & 76. Apart from the voting and, presumably, the ballot access cases, it is unclear
how Ely would treat the "fundamental interest" branch of equal protection doctrine under
his model.
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constitutional policies expressed by the equal protection clause, consis-
tent with Ely's representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review and,
indeed, not infrequently employed by the current Court although it often
labels what it is doing as something else.'
When a facially neutral governmental rule or decision has dispropor-
tionately disadvantageous effects, an appropriate inquiry is to assess the
type of good that is being disproportionately denied the racial minority
or the poor or any other group there is good reason to suspect the com-
munity majority of wanting to keep out of its ranks in terms of the cen-
trality of the good to the ordinary channels of individual mobility in con-
temporary society. A "right" or "interest" is relatively "fundamental" in
this sense not because judges, moral philosophers, American tradition,
or some other provision of the Constitution rank it as relatively "more
important" than others. Rather, it is "fundamental" because its dispropor-
tionate denial does just what the popular majority and therefore our
governmental officials are suspected of impermissibly wanting to do-
perpetuating caste and, in turn, reinforcing private hostility and prejudice
by blocking or impeding access to the mainstream community.'
Shapiro v. Thomspon fits comfortably within this mold: the classifica-
tion there effectively impeded many of the poor (and only the poor) from
exercising what most would concede to be one of the most basic modes
of social, economic and political mobility in this society -interstate
migration.' The cases involving political franchise and candidate restric-
, See text accompanying notes 84-91 infra.
On this view, cases such as James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (rejecting equal pro-
tection challenge to state constitutional provision requiring approval of low-income housing
by special community vote); and United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (rejecting equal
protection challenge to large filing fee for bankruptcy as applied to indigents) are wrongly
decided. On the other hand, a case such as Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (rejecting
challenge to welfare rule requiring warrantless home visit for nonconsenting recipients), is
not incorrect as an equal protection matter even though another constitutional value-the
fourth amendment-is implicated. One might well question, however, the neutrality of a fourth
amendment doctrine that decides Wyman this way and yet holds to be impermissible war-
rantless searches of factories by OSHA inspectors. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307
(1978); see Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence ofProperty Rights as the Foremst Principle of Civil
Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1980, at 66.
" This "fundamental interest" aspect of equal protection doctrine traces back at least to
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). At a time when the Court was apparently un-
willing to reject as impermissible all governmental rules premised on notions of "separate
but equal"-a notion we have since come to view as fundamentally at odds with the four-
teenth amendment's promise of equal citizenship-a significant part of the Court's reason-
ing rested upon its assessment of the "importance" of public education at that point in the
nation's history. The Court emphasized the relationship between public education and the
individual child's "awakening... to cultural values," his ability to exercise the responsibilities
of citizenship and his opportunities for social and economic mobility. Id. at 493. Something
of this view regarding public education may continue to guide the Court today. Witness the
equal protection analysis in the presence of disproportionate racial impact in the public school
area, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick,
443 U.S. 449 (1979), as compared to the "bad subjective motive" standard the Court seems
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tions also fit well within this model.5
Certain recent decisions arguably reflect the same concerns although
the Court has unfortunately used "fundamental right" substantive due pro-
cess reasoning to get to the end result.' Although the plurality opinion
in Moore v. City of East Cleveland8' invoked substantive due process and
emphasized the "fundamental interest" in the family generally in in-
validating a law forbidding certain extended family living arrangements
in a suburb zoned for single family dwellings, the disproportionate effect
of such a law in excluding poor families from the community and the im-
portance of extended family units to the care and rearing of poor children
were clearly the core of concern on the part of certain members of the
plurality .'
(hopefully temporarily) to have saddled itself with in other areas of governmental action
yielding disproportionately disadvantageous effects upon racial minorities, e.g., Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
' E.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (invalidating large filing fees for political can-
didates as applied to indigents); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (same); Turner v. Fouche,
396 U.S. 346 (1970) (invalidating restriction of political office to property owners); Phoenix
v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (invalidating restriction of franchise to property taxpayers);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll tax). Although Ely
might explain these cases as straightforward "political participation" decisions, see J. ELY,
supra note 2, at 120, it is doubtful that they can be fully explained without reference to the
disproportionate impact the invalidated rules had on the poor. Certainly the Court has been
willing to sustain franchise restrictions favoring the wealthy and disadvantaging the majority.
Ball v. James, 101 S. Ct. 1811 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). See also Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
Ely, of course, strongly criticizes the Court's return to substantive due process
methodology, under which it specifies particular nontextual values as "fundamental" and holds
them entitled to extraordinary protection from the ordinary operations of the political pro-
cess. See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 43-72. I agree with that analysis. It has never been clear to
me why, for example, if the majority of us come to decide that autonomy in reproduction,
marriage, family or whatever is less important than our forerunners thought and we are
therefore willing to subject ourselves to modes of governmental behavior more intrusive on
those relationships for the sake of some politically agreed-upon objective -say, population
control or the protection of children- the Court should in the name of natural law, tradition,
"consensus" or whatever tell us we cannot do it. The argument above attempts to distinguish
the "fundamental interests" branch of equal protection analysis as something quite different
justifiable in terms of Ely's own theory, emphasizing, inter alia, judicial insistence that govern-
ment treat members of minority groups tainted by community prejudice as full citizens at
the point of political decision.
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Id. at 507-10 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring). Obviously, the "fundamental
interest" mode of strict equal protection scrutiny advocated above, no less than any other
doctrinal method, requires judgment and is susceptible of manipulation and misuse. Even
under that approach, Moore v. City of East Cleveland is a problematic decision. The best that
can be said for the plurality's result is that a prophylactic rule against such zoning laws will
forbid attempts by white or upper income suburbs to further segregate the urban poor by
disallowing extended family living patterns. Prophylactic rules can have counterproductive
effects in particular applications, however, as when living patterns in stable, racially integrated
communities are disrupted, leading to white flight and resegregation. It is ironic, especially
given the strong correlation between race and poverty, but nonetheless possible that par-
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Similarly, although the plurality opinion in Zablocki v. Redhai89 pur-
ported to employ "fundamental interest" equal protection doctrine in in-
validating a law forbidding marriage by certain persons with outstanding
child support obligations, the Court's analysis, emphasizing the traditional
importance of marriage in our society, smacks almost entirely of the new
substantive due process.? Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment,
got the point right. Observing both the tenuous relationships between the
statute's particular classifications and the permissible governmental ob-
jectives that the state identified and the various counterproductive im-
pacts on the upwardly mobile poor, he concluded that the statute was a
"clumsy and deliberate legislative discrimination between the rich and the
poor ... ,91 In particular, Justice Stevens twice adverted to that il-
legitimate status the marriage-forbidding statute would cast upon the
children of poor couples who would, marriage or no, proceed to beget. This
is precisely the sort of caste-reinforcing intergenerational effect that
should command a court's rapt attention when facially neutral statutes
ticular governmental actions encouraging racial integration will disproportionately disadvan-
tage the poor. Use of "tipping point" housing and school integration plans, for example, may
have such effects, and it is certain that the Court will be called upon to struggle with such
difficult issues in the years ahead. See Johnson v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 604 F.2d 504
(7th Cir. 1979), vacated, 449 U.S. 915 (1980); Note, Benign Steering and Benign Quotas: The Validi-
ty of Race-Conscious Government Policies to Promote Residential Integration, 93 HARv. L. REV.
938, 94047 (1980).
The best resolution of the Moore case may well be Justice Stevens', viewing the ordinance
as applied to Ms. Moore's own home as an unreasonable use regulation resulting in a taking
of property without compensation. 431 U.S. at 513-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
This leaves open the possibility that integrated communities could impose such zoning restric-
tions on rental property. Cf. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d 1283,1290-91 (7th Cir. 1977) (in sustaining challenge under Fair Housing Act to refusal
to rezone property to permit construction of low-cost housing, the Court indicated that
disproportionate impact is to be measured not only by reference to groups adversely affected
by consequent exclusion, but also by reference to degree of integration currently existing
in community). Moreover, the ownership and use of property is a critical channel of mobility
in this society and restrictions on property use that disproportionately disadvantage the poor
should often be seen as abridging a "fundamental interest" under the analysis in the text.
See generally Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969); L. TRmz, supra note 73, at S 1641.
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
o Id. at 383-87. It was that emphasis on the "fundamental" interest in marriage qua mar-
riage that gave the plurality, id. at 387 n.12, the Chief Justice writing separately, id. at 391,
and Justice Powell concurring in the judgment, id. at 396-99, great difficulty in distinguishing
the case from obviously permissible state regulations of the marriage relationship and the
decision in Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1978), and opened the way for Justice Rehnquist's
most powerful point in dissent, 434 U.S. at 407-08.
" 434 U.S. at 406.
In sum, the public-charge provision is either futile or perverse insofar as it ap-
plies to childless couples, couples who will have illegitimate children if they are
forbidden to marry, couples whose economic status will be improved by mar-
riage, and couples who are so poor that the marriage will have no impact on
the welfare status of their children in any event.
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bear disproportionately on groups protected from overt discrimination
under the suspect classification branch of equal protection analysis.
Without more affirmative governmental assistance, some of the poor
may never escape their status; many others may be several generations
in doing so. But what they all as citizens are entitled to is equal protec-
tion of the laws-protection from caste-reinforcing legislation that,
whether hostilely motivated or merely reflective of unconscious acceptance
of derogatory generalizations about "them," drastically and unequally im-
pedes their efforts to escape."
III
I noted above that Ely's elaboration of his model of judicial review pro-
ceeds on the basis of what is at best a brief and fragmentary analysis
of the constitutional core of the political system the courts are supposed
to be reinforcing. I am not certain whether the deficiency I perceive in
Ely's treatment of the problem of governmental representation of
minorities is related to this lack of a more thorough going analysis of our
political system of representative democracy. I suspect, however, that
there is at least a loose connection between the two, and that there is
a closer affinity between the second and third paragraphs of the Carolene
Products footnote -indeed, among all three paragraphs of the footnote -
than Ely has developed thus far.
In simple if not simplistic outline, my suggestion is that the existence
and maintenance over time of a relatively fixed, sizable and intergenera-
tional group of community outcasts will threaten, just as it did in
Perhaps contrary to Ely's view, see J. ELY, supra note 2, at 157-61, it is important to
observe that with respect to the disproportionate effects cases no less than those in which
the government overtly employs a suspect criterion, the impermissibility of governmental
action premised upon "positive we/negative them" generalizations is not necessarily a func-
tion of the relative accuracy or inaccuracy of the stereotype. Social separation and class or
caste mores do generate and reinforce common behavioral patterns among group members,
which behavior in turn reinforces those mores and may frequently make some of "our"
derogatory generalizations about "them" reasonably accurate. The constitutional point is that
such group generalizations, whatever their relative accuracy in comparison to the mine-run
of legislative generalizations, should not be permitted to justify governmental action substan-
tially and disproportionately impairing or denying important opportunities or avenues for
social mobility by individual members of the "them" group when more precisely focused means
of achieving legitimate governmental objectives are available. The sophistication of the analysis
in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) should be extended well beyond the obviously inten-
tional discrimination perpetuated by means of a facially neutral rule in that case:
[T]he opportunity ... given negro voters to free themselves from the effects
of discrimination to which they should never have been subjected was too cabined
and confined. The restrictions must be judged with reference to those for whom
they were designed. It must be remembered that we are dealing with a body
of citizens lacking the habits and traditions of political independence and other-
wise living in circumstances which do not encourage initiative and enterprise.
Id. at 276.
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antebellum America, the long term survivability of an open, pluralist and
relatively democratic political system for two interrelated reasons. The
first is the high probability that some substantial portion of the society,
consisting of members of the outcast group and their sympathizers, will
come to reject the essential legitimacy of a political system that yields
such results. When that occurs, such persons will not confine their political
activities to those means acceptable to and consistent with an open and
pluralist political system. The second is that the majoritarian response
to such behavior, to be effective in repressing it, must itself be inconsis-
tent with and tend permanently to undermine the essential features of
an open and relatively democratic political system and its necessarily con-
comitant guarantees of civil liberty for the individual. 3
Whatever the validity of the foregoing hypothesis, it is clear that Ely's
own conception of the constitutional system of representative democracy
is insufficiently developed. Perhaps the best single illustration of this is
his argument that the nondelegation doctrine should be revived. While
generally content to view the essence of the American political system
in terms of traditional pluralist theory,94 in advocating a nondelegation
doctrine Ely adopts a proposal whose leading proponent is also a leading
critic of pluralist political theory. 5 At a minimum, such a shift would seem
to call for explanation in terms of deeper theory than Ely gives. Moreover,
I believe the argument for the nondelegation doctrine to be just plain
wrong as a matter of judicially enforceable constitutional law.
The problem these days, Ely says, is that too much of our law is actually
made by "faceless bureaucrats" - nonelected and politically unaccountable
officials in the executive branch and administrative agencies -pursuant
to open-ended delegations of authority from the Congress. Legislators
enact such statutes because doing so allows them to avoid hard political
choices and the political heat from constituents that controversial rules
generate. The result, says Ely, is "undemocratic": "[B]y refusing to
Although the decision in the case may be justifiably out of favor, Justice Frankfurter
made the point as well as any in Minnersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940):
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive senti-
ment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and spirit
which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from
generation to generation, and thereby create that continuity of a treasured com-
mon life which constitutes a civilization.
Id. at 596.
" See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 77-80. The major exception lies, of course, in the area of govern-
mental action intended to injure unpopular minorities. Id. at ch. 6.
" See T. Lowi. THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979).
98
As Congressman Levitas put it, "When hard decisions have to be made, we
pass the buck to the agencies with vaguely worded statutes." And as Con-
gressman Flowers added, what comes later is a virtually no-loss situation:
"[Tlhen we stand back and say when our constituents are aggrieved or op-
pressed by various rules and regulations, 'Hey, it's not me. We didn't mean
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legislate our legislators are escaping the sort of accountability that is
crucial to the intelligible functioning of a democratic republic."97
To redress this malfunctioning in the legislative process, Ely would
revive the constitutional doctrine of Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan" and
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,99 which invalidated pieces
of New Deal legislation as impermissible delegations of legislative
authority -"that is, for passing the decision authority on to other per-
sons without a 'standard' or 'intelligible principle' to guide their policy
choices.""1 ' The nondelegation doctrine would force legislators to do what
they are elected to do; this, Ely argues in keeping with his broad theme,
is judicial review reinforcing the essentials of representative democracy.
I do not know if Ely was surprised when the first use made of his argu-
ment was by Justice Rehnquist in support of the contention that section
6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act was an invalid delega-
tion of legislative authority."' Whether he was surprised or not, Justice
Rehnquist's use of the nondelegation argument both illustrates and sym-
bolizes what is wrong with it.
First, neither Ely nor his supporting authorities..2 make any convinc-
ing showing that the courts could successfully develop and apply workable
standards-meaning relatively consistent, predictable and meaningful in
terms of the constitutional policies thought to be served"'-across the in-
credibly broad and variant range of social, technological and economic
issues which legislation in an increasingly complex society may address. 4
Ely's contention that a revived nondelegation doctrine need not insist
"either on more [legislated] detail than [is] feasible or that matters be set-
that. We passed this well-meaning legislation, and we intended for those peo-
ple out there . . . to do exactly what we meant, and they did not do it.'"
J. ELY. supra note 2, at 132.
97 Id.
9' 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
100 J. ELY, supra note 2, at 132.
" Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Pet. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686-87 & n.6
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The statute provides, in pertinent part, that the Secretary
of Labor "'in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents
... shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis
of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health
or functional capacity .... ' (emphasis added)" Id. at 671 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting
29 U.S.C. S 655(b)(5) (1970)).
"12 T. Lowi. supra note 95, at 298-300; McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated
Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119,1127-30 (1977); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE
L.J. 575 (1972).
03 Ely does not say from which of the Constitution's "open-ended" provisions the Court
would derive the nondelegation doctrine. Serious disagreement might be expected between
Ely and Justice Rehnquist as to the doctrine's applicability to state legislation.
"0 See K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE S 3:4 (2d ed. 1978). Although Davis also ad-
vocates use of a nondelegation doctrine, it is of a very different sort and is responsive to
quite different constitutional policies than those Ely has in mind. Id. at SS 3:13, :15.
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tled with more permanence than the subject matter... allow[s '1 5 asserts
hope rather than promise, for there is no apparent reason to expect judges
to have any particular expertise in making that judgment and substan-
tial reason to believe that they would be worse than legislators at mak-
ing it. Certainly it is not the accurate characterization of the "nondelega-
tion doctrine ... at its high point" that he says it is, ' as at least one
of his two case authorities, Panama Refining, 0 7 demonstrates. I do not
think there is any reasonable argument that that case was rightly decid-
ed on its facts ' and find it difficult to believe that Ely really considers
the legislation there invalidated not to have provided, in his words, "policy
direction [which] is all that [is] ever required." 109 It is illustrative of the
point I am making, however, that Justice Rehnquist approves of and would
reaffirm Panama Refining.10 There is very little reason to believe that
the Court would be able to do any better job here than in the companion
area of judicial control over congressional exercise of the commerce power,
with whose demise-far more than that of economic substantive due
process-the death of the nondelegation doctrine was associated."'
Second, and more to the constitutional point, Ely's argument regarding
the need for a revived nondelegation doctrine misapprehends the nature
and sources of political accountability under our constitutional system of
representative democracy. His illustration of the delegating Congressper-
son's defensive tactic- "Hey, it's not me. We didn't mean that"'-seems
indistinguishable from that which the same Congressperson would use
whenever a constituent complained of a particular judicial, executive or
administrative application of a complex statute. Moreover, the likelihood
that the tactic will be successful in taking the elected official off the
... J. ELY, supra note 2, at 133.
106 Id.
293 U.S. at 388.
See id. at 433-48 (Cardozo, J., dissenting); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AD.
MINISTRATIVE ACTION 62-63 (1965).
"' J. ELY, supra note 2, at 133. Whatever else can be said for or against the nondelegation
part of the other decision relied on, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. at 495, it is sufficient here to observe that that case involved a large component of
delegation to private parties, a feature that may invoke quite different constitutional con-
siderations than those Ely discusses. See K. DAVIS. supra note 104, at S 3:12.
"I Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Pet. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 674-75, 686 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
. Opposing revival of the constitutional nondelegation doctrine does not, of course, leave
the courts without any role in the area. Statutorily provided judicial review should lead
to invalidation of administrative action when a court is reasonably convinced it exceeds
statutory authorization and many of the same policies are often served without invalidating
the legislation. See generally id. at 642-46. Nor in rejecting the nondelegation doctrine in
its "pure" form do I mean to deny the utility of delegation-like reasoning in cases involving
particular constitutional values when legislative consideration of the particular issue is
unclear. See A. BICKEL. THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 151-52,156-69 (1962); Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). But see id. at 117-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"' See note 96 supra.
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political hotseat vis-a-vis persons or groups adversely affected is about
the same. With either sort of statute, a political decision has been made
by Congress,"' it can be reversed by Congress, and there really cannot
be serious doubt that aggrieved persons wanting either rectification or
retribution have the same weapons at their disposal and the same
knowledge about in whose direction those weapons should be pointed.
The ballot box is not the only, and in isolation is not the most impor-
tant, means of political control over the Congress and its members. Our
system displays innumerable ways of influencing, restraining and sanc-
tioning the people's representative. Campaign contributions and support,
lobbyists representing both so-called public and special interests of every
sort and bearing a variety of inducements, newspaper editorials, political
party structure and relationships (particularly at the state level), inter-
nal congressional organization and resource allocations, logrolling with
fellow members of Congress-all these and more render our represen-
tatives politically influenceable and accountable. Whatever the residual
deception of the average voter-by Ely's hypothesis, one who would think
or care about the matter at all-as to who should be held accountable
when a Congressperson votes to delegate a hard political choice rather
than bite the bullet directly, the persons exercising these more precisely
focused control mechanisms know exactly what is happening and why. It
is quite doubtful that our representatives ultimately are held accountable
at the ballot box for votes on particular statutes except insofar as these
myriad other forms of political control influence the election process, or
that there is any significant difference between the delegating and the
bullet-biting statute in terms of the exercise or potency of these modes
of control. And in the last analysis, if the public gets upset in a more
generalized way (the only way the general public can) with the results
of government by delegation, the 1980 elections surely demonstrated that
it can make its collective voice heard.1
Finally, as symbolized by Justice Rehnquist's use of it, Ely's nondelega-
tion proposal would weave an antigovernment basis into the fabric of con-
stitutional law."5 Although the result-less governmental regulation-is
reminiscent of economic substantive due process, the nondelegation doc-
trine as a judicial technique more closely resembles the renowned but equal-
.j CHOPER. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 373 (1980).
' I have found the sensitive and insightful commentary on American politics in G.
WILLS. CONFESSIONS OF A CONSERVATIVE 80-116, 131-42, 170-84 (1979), useful background for
reflection on these issues. In contrast, I find rather incredible the diagnosis and prescrip-
tion for cure of the supposed American political malaise presented by Ely's leading authority,
see T. LowI. supra note 95, at 298-300.
"s Ely observes this in passing, noting that "liberals may not like it .... " J. ELY, supra
note 2, at 133-34. The question is not whether liberals like it but whether the Constitution
warrants it. In my view, and that of a consistent majority of the Supreme Court since the
1930's, it does not.
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ly discredited view of the equal protection clause floated by Justice
Jackson in Railway Express Agency v. New York."' Justice Jackson's
analysis would, if applied, have disabled New York City from promoting
aesthetics or traffic safety by forbidding trucks from carrying adver-
tisements for hire because advocates of the legislation lacked the political
strength to have the policy applied more generally to self-advertising
vehicles or Times Square billboards. In a similar fashion, use of the
nondelegation doctrine would often result in no governmental promotion
or protection of certain social interests where some is otherwise obtainable
in a pluralistic political system merely because its advocates lack the
political muscle to obtain more.
Compromise is the woof and warp of politics and legislation and one
of the keys to the essential stability of our representative democracy.
Delegation is just one, though perhaps an increasingly important one, of
the forms of compromise, where none of the contending forces-can obtain
all they want or avoid all they do not want. Judicial refusal of the delega-
tion option to the legislature -and, ultimately, to the multifarious interest
groups in our pluralistic political system -demands far more constitutional
justification than Ely gives.17 While particular provisions of or structural
inferences from the Constitution may warrant judicial conclusions that
particular decision processes or outcomes are impermissible, that docu-
ment does not erect a single conception of a representative democracy
or impose a single method of governmental decisionmaking. Any one of
a number of modes of political decision, political influence and political
accountability are consistent with the Constitution's basic premises and
first principles, and the advocates of the nondelegation doctrine have not
convincingly shown that statutory delegation is not one of them."1 8
'is 336 U.S. 106, 112-16 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); see A. BICKEL. supra note 111, at
222-27.
" The point is not that we cannot do better than legislate open-ended delegations of
authority to administrators, or that better modes of political accountability over the ac-
tions of such administrators cannot be fashioned. The point is that there is no reason to
expect the Court to be good at doing it, and that there is no adequate constitutional war-
rant for it to try.
"I I cannot resist noting my difficulty in certain other respects with Ely's apparent con-
ception of the constitutional core of our political system. I have in mind particularly his
brief but seemingly uncritical acceptance of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), as a first
amendment case involving the "suppression of communication." See J. ELY. supra note 2,
at 233 n.27. In Buckley, the Court invalidated, inter alia, the candidate and independent
expenditure limitations of the Federal Election Campaign Act; Ely's only criticism is that
the first amendment standard the Court invoked was not "stringent" enough.
I have great difficulty-viewing that case solely, or even primarily, in terms of the first
amendment- "speech" was not suppressed, the expenditure of money for speech-related
purposes was regulated on a content-neutral basis, and the expenditure of funds for pur-
poses of promoting political ideas was not limited. In my view, the Congress of the United
States made a judgment regarding the allocation of political influence over our elected of-
ficials that, on the facts presented in Buckley, did not transgress any constitutional premise
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Given Ely's basic approach to judicial review, it is also troublesome that
he does not treat federalism in any systematic way. That political con-
ception played a central role in the two most momentous occasions in the
Constitution's history-its original drafting and its fundamental altera-
tion by the post-Civil War amendments-and in one form or another is
probably the major issue in the current debate over whether we shall give
ourselves a third such occasion by ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA). Moreover, federalism was, as Ely acknowledges, a central pillar
in Madison's pluralist theory,"9 that theory upon which Ely in large part
builds his model of judicial review.
There is, of course, something unfair about criticizing Ely, who has given
us so much, for not giving us more. Nevertheless, there are dangers when
a system builder such as Ely truncates his subject matter, not merely in
the sense that the resultant model is more artificial and less reflective
of the primary phenomena, but also in that variables formally included
within the model may be misunderstood due to their intimate relation-
ship to others excluded from consideration.
In the case at hand, it appears to me that Ely's exclusion of federalism
has led him to a seriously deficient conception of the ninth amendment.'"
Rejecting the "received 'federalism'" account of that amendment which
renders it meaningless as duplicative of the tenth amendment, 2' Ely
underlying the system of democratic republicanism entitling the "Court as referee" to blow
the whistle. See 424 U.S. at 257-66 (White, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). There
simply is no single conception of a representative democracy, either generally agreed upon
or framed by the Constitution. In the context of the reapportionment cases, for example,
(which Ely does handle effectively) see M. SHAPIRO. LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT
218-32 (1964); A. BICKEL, supra note 111, at 189-97; A. BICKEL. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS 166-73 (1978). The congressional judgment in Buckley was, for me, no more
out of line with the basic system principle than, say, a congressional decision to have members
of the House of Representatives elected on an at-large basis or under a system of propor-
tional party representation rather than under the familiar individual district system.
There were first amendment vagueness difficulties involved with the independent ex-
penditure limitations in Buckley, but they seem no different in kind nor less amenable to
resolution through a pattern of administrative action than those involved with governmen-
tal restraints on the political activities of public employees which a majority of the Court
so willingly approved in United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Car-
riers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). See also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
Now I could be wrong in this, and Ely could be right that Buckley is properly viewed
as a first amendment case involving "suppression of communication" and, as such, was cor-
rectly decided. But what is wanting is an explanation of why this is so, an explanation that
would have to derive from a more extensive and systematic theory of the constitutionally
minimum core of representative democracy than Ely has provided.
J, j. ELY, supra note 2, at 80.
l "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
12 The "received 'federalism'" account of the ninth amendment is that expressed by Justice
Black dissenting in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): "That Amendment was
passed .... as every student of history knows, to assure the people that the Constitution
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argues that both the language and the'history (what little there is) of the
ninth amendment indicate the "existence of federal constitutional rights
beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution.. .. "I' As with
other open-textured constitutional provisions, Ely seeks a "principled ap-
proach to judicial enforcement.., that is not hopelessly inconsistent with
our nation's commitment to representative democracy... ."I' In applica-
tion, Ely uses the ninth amendment to justify the result in Bolling v.
Sharpe,"4 finding it the only responsible basis for application of an equal
protection concept against the federal government. Although the point
is not further developed, Ely presumably would apply his representation-
reinforcing view of the equal protection clause' full force against the
federal government through the ninth amendment for he concludes: "[I]n
terms of respect for the judgments of federal courts and the success of
enforcement efforts it seems important that the states not be bound by
a set of textually unstated constitutional rights that do not restrain the
actions of the federal government." 26 What Ely does not discuss is the
possibility that the federal government might be bound by a set of tex-
tually unstated constitutional rights that do not, as a matter of federal
law, restrain the actions of state governments.
A central premise of Ely's approach to judicial review is that judicially
enforceable constitutional rights derive from the political community-
specifically, from the community's constitution which sets the parameters
of "ordinary" political decisions by declaring certain substantive outcomes
and certain modes of decisionmaking out of bounds. Judicially enforceable
rights specifically do not derive from some other and ulterior source such
as natural law, a view Ely attributes directly to the framers of the ninth
amendment."= But under that view, the apparent sources of those rights
the framers referred to in the ninth amendment are the states-those
political communities (also democratic republics, it is worth noting) that
the Constitution recognizes in addition to the national political communi-
ty it creates."
The facially apparent import of the ninth amendment is to indicate that
in all its provisions was intended to limit the Federal Government to the powers granted
expressly or by necessary implication." Id. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting).
J . ELY, supra note 2, at 38.
'2 Id. at 41.
,z, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (invalidating racial segregation in the District of Columbia schools).
The Warren Court used the due process clause of the fifth amendment as the textual peg
for applying the equal protection reasoning of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
against the federal government, a conclusion Ely rejects in line with his argument that
the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments require only that the govern-
ment use fair procedures when acting to inflict serious harm upon specific individuals. J.
ELY. supra note 2, at 14-21, 32-33.
121 J. ELY. supra note 2, at 135-79.
12 Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
,2 See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 400 n.3 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
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as against the federal government, "the people" may "retain" constitu-
tional rights in addition to those specifically enumerated in the Constitu-
tion and that the way the people retain constitutional rights is by forbid-
ding governmental actions abridging them. This suggests that if the peo-
ple of the states retain rights as against their state governments, such
rights are also safeguarded under the ninth amendment from abridgment
by the exercise of those powers delegated to the federal government.1"
Ely's only reference to this possibility is his observation "that state law,
even state constitutional law, is incompetent [to control the actions of the
federal government] and must therefore content itself with controlling the
actions of the state governments." ' But valid as that proposition is as
a general matter-that is, federal law is supreme over state law under
article VI-the most obvious reading of the ninth amendment is that the
framers reversed it in regard to "rights retained by the people," both
foreseeing and providing that the people of the states could create rights
as against those governments which should not be abridged by the federal
government. This conception of the ninth amendment is consistent with
the federalism concerns which are known to have motivated its adoption,
does not render it duplicative of the tenth amendment, and offers an ob-
jective and textually indicated source of constitutional values not
enumerated in the document itself. Moreover, this view of the ninth
amendment could be consistent with Ely's "representation-reinforcing" ap-
proach to judicial review, at least if he were to integrate a federalism
dimension within it.
To illustrate, suppose that the proposed ERA fails of ratification by
a sufficient number of states. It is difficult to predict what the consequent
" I find this conception of the ninth amendment consistent with the amendment's history
as detailed in Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2-9 (1980), although
Berger would doubtless disagree. I in turn find far from persuasive Berger's conclusion
that the ninth amendment merely confirms that "the people reserved to themselves power
to add or subtract from the rights enumerated in the Constitution by the process of Amend-
ment exclusively confided to them by Article V." Id. at 14. Among other things, Article
V, unlike the ninth amendment, makes no reference at all to "the people."
13 J. ELY. supra note 2, at 37. Ely does discuss the possibility that
the Ninth Amendment was intended to indicate not that there were other
federal constitutional rights, but rather that the enumeration of certain rights
in the first eight amendments was not to be taken to deny or disparage the
existence of other sorts of rights-rights that do not rise to the constitutional,
at least not to the federal constitutional level. That is, it might have been in-
tended to make clear that despite the Bill of Rights Congress could create fur-
ther rights .... or that a state could do so in its own constitution.
Id. at 36-37. He rejects the view that the ninth amendment grants the federal government
power to create additional rights since its federalism context makes clear that the ninth
as well as the tenth amendment restrict the powers of the federal government. In the alter-
native, he argues that it is "silly" to read the ninth amendment as "rebut[ting] the inference
that the Bill of Rights, controlling only federal action, had somehow preempted the efforts
of the people of the various states" to create new rights enforceable against their state
governments. J. ELY, supra note 2, at 37.
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impact will be upon the Supreme Court's application of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause to gender classifications, but it might
be that failure to adopt the ERA would subsequently give the Court pause
before rejecting out of hand as illegitimate the justification that a recent-
ly enacted Utah or Alabama statute embodying a gender classification pro-
motes "the State's preference for an allocation of family responsibilities
under which the wife plays a dependent role, and ... seek[s] [as its] ob-
jective the reinforcement of that model among the State's citizens."'' In
the event the Court felt compelled to acknowledge the legitimacy of such
a state purpose, it nevertheless should not, given the ninth amendment,
concede the legitimacy of such a governmental purpose when analyzing
gender classifications in federal statutes. After all, thirty-five states did
ratify the ERA. A number of the ratifying states have ERA-counterpart
provisions in their state constitutions and others have reached the same
judgment through state court interpretations of state constitutions. In that
circumstance, the impermissibility of laws premised on gender-based role
allocations should be deemed a "right ... retained by the people" in a
sufficient number of states as to render invalid disparagement or denial
of the right by the federal government.
Viewing the ninth amendment as textually commanding protection
against federal abridgment of individual rights first created and protected
by the states could be "representation-reinforcing" in the following senses
(although these are not the only possibilities). Even if it is unlikely that
Congress with its members elected from the states would, for example,
now enact gender-based legislation,132 new statutes are not the only and,
in a time of rapid social change, are perhaps not the primary source of
federal law violative of rights originating at the state level of the federal
system. Rather, most of the existing body of federal law was formulated
at an earlier and quite different time and the ordinary inertia always at-
tending the legislative process could delay indefinitely repeal of existing
gender-based statutes. Furthermore, a legislative minority in the Congress
always has substantial ability to block new legislation. 3' Social change is
often controversial and, for example, a highly motivated congressional
minority drawn from states rejecting the ERA and a policy of gender
131 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979).
'3 Assessment of the realistic possibility of this occurring is complicated by a number
of factors, not the least of which is the political temper of a given moment. Transitory political
majorities at the state no less than the national level may reject the philosophy underlying
a constitutionally enshrined value. That is why we write rights into constitutions in the
first place. Also potentially troublesome is the way we select our federal congress. Each
state, regardless of population size, gets two Senators. Members of the House, however,
are allocated among the States on the basis of population, are elected by districts, and the
majority sentiment in any one of which may or may not correspond to that of the state
as a whole.
' J. ELY, supra note 2, at 67; J. CHOPER, supra note 104, at 27. See generally id. at 12-45.
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neutrality might well be able to block efforts to repeal gender distinc-
tions in existing federal statutes. On a similar view of social change in
the states and the legislative process in Congress, it might be that other
older federal laws-sexual orientation classifications, for example-could
in the not too distant future become candidates for serious scrutiny under
a federalism-promoting view of the ninth amendment."M
V
The immediately preceding discussion prompts my final observation on
Democracy and Distrust. As powerful and, in broad outline, persuasive
as the book is, it is not so comprehensive as its subtitle: "A Theory of
Judicial Review." Alexander Bickel is a central character in Ely's book,
one whom Ely describes as "probably the most creative constitutional
theorist of the past twenty years,"1 and it is Bickel's more than any other
"fundamental value" approach to constitutional law to which Ely responds
and which Ely would replace with his unique version of process
methodology. To lay colorable claim of superior title to Bickel's homestead,
however-to offer what is truly a theory of judicial review-Ely will have
to broaden his sights to encompass more of the ground over which Bickel
labored so long and so well. I am not certain whether that requires a
theory of constitutional government. 8' I am certain that it requires ex-
tensive and integrated treatment of those three old companions in arms -
justiciability, separation of powers and federalism-and, thereby, a more
extensive elaboration of both the justification for and the limits of judicial
review than Ely has attempted thus far. If he gets around to writing
that one, book review or not, I am sure I will read it more than once.
34 See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d
592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979). This view of the ninth amendment raises, of course, a host
of subsidiary issues that need to be addressed. How many states need recognize and pro-
tect a "right" before the federal government is forbidden from denying or disparaging it?
Is a majority of states necessary? sufficient? Does the population size of particular states
matter? What form of state recognition and protection is required? Must, for example, the
"right" be recognized at the constitutional level in all states that "count"?
Such difficulties notwithstanding, federalism concerns are known to have motivated the
framing of the ninth amendment, J. ELY. supra note 2, at 34-36, and the conception of that
amendment suggested above is consistent with the core political values of federalism-
diversity and pluralism. It is frequently argued that those values are threatened or under-
mined when federal standards of constitutional right are applied against states affording
less protection; but they are no less threatened or undermined when federal law acts to
undercut individual rights in states that recognize and protect them. This seems particularly
apparent in the gender discrimination area, for example, where federal law reinforcing sex-
based role modeling, as in the social welfare and benefit programs, could seriously under-
mine efforts by the people of particular states to progress to a gender-neutral society.
133 J. ELY. supra note 2, at 71.
13 See Tribe, supra note 27, at 1079-80.
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